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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS AS
PART OF THE RES GESTA.
Much of the confusion in the cases dealing with the admissibility of declarations as part of the res gesta arises from
the different uses to which the phrase has been put by the
courts. The term res gesta is used indifferently to denote
various conceptions-among others:
i. Those occurrences or facts to which as a whole the
law attaches legal consequences, and so, of course, open to
investigation as a whole.'
2. Similar to this, it is used to indicate that a series of
occurrences are part of one transaction, all parts of
which are actuated by the same motive or intent-so making any competent exhibition of intent governing one part,
evidence that the same motive also actuated every other.
3. It is used to indicate the extent of the business or
transaction about which two persons are legally identified
'There is also a loose use of the term denoting a fact undoubtedly

relevant-a sort of higher relevancy-the distinction between kith and
kin.
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with one another, and so defining the limit of responsibility of the one for the acts and statements of the other.
4. It indicates-and this is perhaps the typical use of it
-those attending circumstances of any fact whenever provable, which are necessary to properly understand it, which
show its true nature, which are inseparable from it, without which a recital of the fact would be inadequate and misleading-proof of- such concomitant circumstances being
allowed though some of them if they stood alone would, as2
hearsay, be incapable of proof by the witness to such fact.
It is as to this last conception as admitting declarations in
this sense part of the res gesta that the cases are most in
conflict.
On first glance it would appear to be an exception to
the rules against hearsay. It is at least doubtful if it is so.
The rule against the admission of hearsay testimony prevents the use of a statement of one not called as a witness
as proof of the facts narrated therein.
Proof of words spoken or written is very often entirely
consistent with the rule. That words are spoken, and what
those words are, may be the very fact in issue, as in cases of
slander or contract. It is the speaking of the words or the
writing of them which affects the legal rights and liabilities
of the parties to the litigation, irrespective of the truth of
any facts which they may recite. So the fact that a statement has been made may equally be a relevant fact; as to
establish knowledge of a fact already shown to exist. In
neither of these cases can the statement be used to prove the
fact therein recited, unless they fall within some recognized
principle of exception to the rule against hearsay, or unless
offered against the party making it, and if the fact which
they recite is a necessary element of the case, the court will
hold that the party bound to prove it has not met the burden
imposed on him, if this be his only evidence. Of course once
in, it is difficult, in fact impossible, to prevent it from influ'There is, as will be seen, a use of the term to denote narrative
statements admissible in some jurisdictions because made under the
immediate impression of the fact which they recite, and so far from
any suspicion of fabrication-this last is a pure exception of hearsay.
This is distinct from the last conception, but the distinction does not
appear to have been noted by the courts who have introduced this use.
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encing the jury. This is an incidental and unavoidable evil,
which since it cannot be cured must be endured.'

The chief characteristics of the various exceptions to
hearsay are two: The necessity of providing against a failure of direct proof which is inherent in the type of question
presented or the kind of fact to be proved.
2. A probability of truthfulness arising out of the circumstances under which the statement is made, which supplies the lack of the sanction of the oath and the at present

much more effective guarantee of accuracy, the test by crossexamination.
As to the first. Of course the mere impossibility of
proof of an essential fact otherwise than by hearsay in any

particular case is not sufficient; to so hold would be to admit
hearsay whenever important. Nor is it enough to exclude
hearsay properly admissible under any recognized exception
that other and direct evidence of the facts exists.4
The necessity is one general to some broad class of question or inherent in the proof of some type of fact.5
It is only the most urgent necessity which will cause the
courts to admit such an exception and in no other branch
of the law is its conservatism more apparent; its inertia more
difficult to overcome.
-The law of evidence is full of such instances; the mere possibility
of misuse will not render evidence proper for any purpose inadmissible,
as where evidence of a previous crime may be proved to show motive,
though no doubt the jury can scarcely fail to be prejudiced against
the accused thereby.
'Roddy v. CoM., 184 Pa. 274.
Pedigree is an instance of the first, a question hardly ever capable of direct proof. The thousand and one details of business, readily
forgotten, in fact almost incapable of distinct recognition, usually entered in some permanent form as in a book or memorandum, and then
put out of mind, is an instance of the latter.
In both cases, having excluded any object for fabrication by showing
that they are made ante lite motain, the probable truth is established
because in the first case they are statements by a member of the family,
and so relate to a matter within the declarant's own knowledge, and
one as to which he may be expected to speak truthfully; and in the
second, because they are either against the pecuniary or proprietary
interest of the declarant or because they are entered in pursuance of a
duty to others which requires an accurate record of such facts, and so
the declaration becomes admissible.
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However, it is doubtful if any contemporaneous statement of an existing fact is to be regarded as hearsay. Still
less obnoxious to the reasons for the exclusion of such
testimony, are declarations offered not as proof but in explanation of existing facts.
A statement accompanying an admissible fact is not from
its mere coincidence in time therewith ipso facto admissible,
-it is admitted if and because it qualifies and explainsin short shows the true quality of the act it accompanies.
It is the fact as so explained which is in reality the evidence
admitted. That the statement may, besides explaining its
accompanying fact, also be probative of and so influence
the jury in regard to some other matter is purely incidental.
If it does not explain the principal fact it cannot be admitted,
no matter how closely in point of time it accompany it and
no matter how vital the fact which it states. It is admitted
not as or because proof of the facts recited therein, but as
a contemporaneous statement showing the quality of the
act it accompanies. Historically, it is submitted that declarations explanatory of a relevant fact, were not originally
admitted as exceptions to hearsay but as a natural part of
the story of a competent witness at a time when the competency of a witness was the sole test6 of the admissibility
of his story, long before his testimony was subject to
scrutiny piecemeal.
The admission of a witness to testify at all, was itself
exceptional. As a rule the jury knew in a general way of
the occurrence. It was only where the witness had that
special knowledge of a fact which comes only from having
seen or heard it, that he was allowed to testify to it, in
order to add to the general gossip of the community his
special knowledge so acquired-in short, his position was
analogous to that of an expert who brings to the assistance
of the jury his scientific knowledge to aid and not to control
them in forming their opinions upon matters as to which
the ordinary man, and so the jury, unaided is unable to
form an accurate judgment. The early witness, in a word,
was an expert in the facts-his testimony did not supersede
' Subject of course to this, that he could not be allowed to ramble
on about matters as to which he was not called as witness.
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nor control the jury's finding, they could still find upon
their general knowledge as neighbors in the very teeth of
the witness's story. Then, too, the witness was often only
called in corroboration of the story told by the counsel for
the parties who indulged in long narrative statements of
the facts constituting his client's cause, this too often called
"evidence"; and often the witness would be merely present
and referred to as ready to corroborate the story of counsel.
But once a witness competent as to a fact he could tell all
he knew of the fact. There was no way of objecting to
any part of his story which related legitimately to the fact
and was part of his knowledge thereof. Thus it is laid
down in Style's PracticalRegister (1670), 173:
"A person that may be admitted as a witness at a trial
may give words in evidence to the jury which were spoken
to him by another person, who by the rules of the court
might not be admitted as a witness at the trial. Mich. 22
Car. 1646, B. R." "It is lawful," says the editor, "for one
that is admitted as a witness to give anything in evidence
which may concern the matter in question."
It would be impossible, in the space of this article, to trace
the change, whereby the propriety of a means of proof has,
from being a question primarily of the competency of the
witness, come to the modern conception that the test is the
logical relevancy of his story and its possible infringement
in whole or in any part upon some definite fixed rule of
exclusion.
In no branch of the law has the conservatism of the
courts been more apparent than in the law of evidence.
The courts have preserved usages long after the conditions
from which they arose disappeared, and have often in forgetfulness of its origin had recourse to reasons for its continuance, which would be far from convincing for its original adoption were the question new.
When the rule against hearsay, with its exception, was
taking form, the courts found the witness testifying as a
matter of established practice to the whole of the transaction both what was done and what was said, and it was
to justify the continuance and not to introduce the practice
that the court held such evidence admissible as pars rei
gestae.
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To properly understand their reasoning in support of its
admissibility as such, it must be remembered that it had
been admitted as a matter of course long before the term
res gesta was used, and long before it was thought necessary
to explain its admissibility by any reasons whatever. In
fact every change which has been made has been restrictive. The court having greater power over the witness has
used it to compel him to restrict his story to those things
which were not only being said and done during the continuance of the fact as to which he was witness, but were
also necessary to its proper comprehension for the purposes
of the trial.
Similarly are statements of an existing mental or bodily
condition to be regarded as exceptions to hearsay or are
they themselves original evidence of such condition?
Such bodily or mental conditions may be proved by contemporaneous oral or written declarations, because they are
the natural exhibitions of existing conditions and as such
original evidence thereof. "They are as direct evidence of
the fact as his own testimony that he had such intention
would be were he alive. After his death there can hardly
be any other way of proving it, and while he is still alive
his own memory of his state of mind at a former time is
no more likely to be clear and true than a bystander's recollection of what he then said, and is less trustworthy than
letters written by him at the very time and under circumstances precluding a suspicion of misrepresentation. The
letters were competent, not as narratives of facts communicated by the writer to others, but only to show his then
existing intention." Gray, J., Hilmon v. Ins. Co., 145
U. S. p. 295.
"The usual expression of such feelings (bodily and men"tal) are original and competent evidence. They are the
"natural reflexes of what might be impossible to show by
"other means. Such declarations are regarded as verbal
"acts and as competent as any other testimony." Swayne,
J., Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 8 Wall. p. 4o4.
In Trefethen v. Com., 157 Mass. 18o, it is said that the
declarant was dead and could not, therefore, be called to
testify directly, and that there existed no reason for fabrica-
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tion. There was no expression of opinion as to the effect
upon the admissibility of this evidence had these elements
been lacking. Their presence was stated as showing that
in the case in hand there could exist no objection on the
ground that more direct evidence was withheld, or that the
source of proof was untrustworthy.
If the evidence were admitted as an exception to hearsay
both of these elements would normally be prerequisites
to its admission. If, on the contrary, the statements were
original evidence as the natural exhibition of such feelings,
then the absence of such elements would only affect the
weight of the evidence, but could not exclude it.
In Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Mass. 359, statements of
workmen to show their knowledge of dangerous condition
created in a business by defendant, and that they left the
plaintiff's employment on account thereof, were admitted,
though no doubt some or most of the workmen could have
been produced in court.
In Hilmon v. Ins. Co., 145 U. S. 285, though in fact the
declarant was dead, Mr. Justice Gray expressly said that
even the recollection of the party as to his pre-existing state
of mind was less likely to be accurate than a letter exhibiting it as a present existing condition. And in cases of physical injuries the statements of the sufferer indicating pain,
whether made to a layman or physician are customarily admitted though the injured person himself testifies in court.
In addition, as is pointed out in Hilmon v. Ins. Co., the
expression of such a feeling by action, as by a grimace or
gesture is but a statement of it by the party feeling it.
True it is a statement in a popular sense verified by action,
but if a statement be not admissible standing alone, it
does not become so because the declarant manifests his
good faith by acting upon it.7 Nor can such action be admitted where it but amounts to indirect, though perhaps
more forcible, assertion of the facts contained in the statement.
How far the absence of motive for fabrication may be
important presents. perhaps, a different question. In both
'Gresham Hotel Company v. Manning, I. Rep. i C. P.
Tatham, 7 A. & E. 361.

125;

Wright v.
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Trefethan v. Com. and Hilmon v. Ins. Co., the statements
were made under circumstances negativing any idea of

motive therefor. In the first, this is expressly alluded to
as excluding any possibility of objection to the evidencein the latter it is statements made in the absence of such
motive, which is spoken of as more valuable than the subsequent testimony of the declarant. Properly speaking, this
should be of importance only as inducing the jury to attach no
importance to statements not so made-and Gray's remarks,
in reality refer to the weight rather than admissibility of
such statements and yet it is quite possible that there may be
in the court sufficient discretion over the admissibility of
evidence to reject not merely such statements, but any acts
done as well where the circumstances show plainly that they
were spoken or done merely to manufacture evidence to
serve the declarant or actor. If the court has this power,
and certainly for the ends of justice, and to prevent the
jury being misled by prejudice, there seems every reason
to allow them it-there seems no adequate logical reason
for distinguishing between .statements and acts, especially
where they are offered to exhibit mental or bodily feelings.
A limp, an expression of pain, is indeed only an expression, a symbol of the bodily condition-perhaps more trustworthy-perhaps less easily assumed, but still readily
capable of fabrication. Such statements usually accompany
some noticeable physical condition, itself a proper mode
of proving the illness, and so would also be admissible as
explanatory of it and pars rei gestae thereof, but many ailments do exist which afford no external symptoms perceptible to a layman, often not even to a physician; in such
cases it seems impossible that any sound distinction should
be drawn between statements in regard thereto and statements in regard to intention and similar mental conditions;
where the ailment usually exhibits itself in some patent
physical effect, it may be proper to exclude the statement,
unless corroborated by the presence of some such symptom,
just as a statement of intention might be excluded if made
under circumstances showing some motive for fabrication."
The court would exercise their prerogative of excluding
,See

Trefethen v. CoMn., 157 Mass. io,

Field, C. J. I9I.
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from the jury evidence which they think harmful, but
where no such corroboration is possible from the nature of
the illness the absence of it does not affect the bona fides
of the statement, in the absence of any other good reason
for false speaking.
"A man's state of mind or feeling can only be manifested to others by countenance, attitude or gesture, or by
sounds or words spoken or. written. The nature of the
fact is the same, and the evidence of its proper tokens is
equally competent to prove it whether expressed by aspect
or conduct, voice, or pen." Hillmon v. Ins. Co.
Upon this principle are admitted declarations of testators
as to their testamentary intent, made before the will was
drawn, to show undue influence; also, as in Sugden v. St.
Leonards, L. R. i P. D. 154, to show the contents of a
lost will proven to have existed; the inference being that
a will if made would embody the testator's previously existing testamentary intent: but not declarations by the
testator after the execution of the will, as to what he had
done, such are at best but narrative of past intention already
fulfilled by execution. Mellish, J., Sugden v. St. Leonards,
Woodward v. Gouddstone, L. R. ii A. C. 469.
Such statements must, then, not be narratives of a past
state of mind or body, but they are admitted if and because
they are contemporaneous exhibitions of an existing condition, not because they are pars rei gestae; necessary to
explain a fact itself relevant. If the condition of mind
or body is by itself an independent relevant fact, they need
not accompany any act, but "where the intention is only
important as qualifying an act, its connection with that act
must be shown." Gray, C. J., Hillmon v. Co.
This is capable of misapprehension. If it be taken to
mean that the expression of it must be contemporaneous
with the action-that it must be a statement made while
acting, showing the object of such action, it would unduly
restrict the admission of such testimony. What is meant
is that the evidence must show that the intention, motive,
knowledge, or whatever the state of mind may be, existed
at the time of the action. If the motive be transitory, as
sudden anger or fear, it must be exhibited as existing very
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near to if not exactly at the time of action. If the intention
is fixed, or the mental or bodily condition permanent, the
time of its exhibition may be farther removed. The question presented is this: in view of the nature of the mental
or bodily condition, is it a fair inference that it continued
from the time of its exhibition until the time of action?
Here the term res gesta is often employed to indicate the
time limits during which the condition may be taken to
continue the same- the limit during which the condition
of the person is open to investigation to show the true
quality of his acts.9
The same use of the term of res gesta is found in the
bankruptcy cases in England, which have led to such confusion, and which have formed the main reliance of those
who have sought for an extension of the rule of res gesta
to embrace everything said by a party to a transaction long
after the fact to which it relates is over.
An act of bankruptcy, an act done with intent to delay
creditors, was a fact necessary to be proved in every case
to show the assignee's right to sue One form was absenting the realm. "The motive of the party in departing the
realm constitutes an act of bankruptcy." 0
So in Rawson v. Haigh,"' letters sent while abroad
which showed such motive, were held to be admissible.
Park, J., denied that such declarations must accompany the
act whose quality is to be determined. "The court is to
judge from the circumstances of the particular case. We
need not say that declarations made a month or even a
shorter period after the act was completed might be admitted; but here there are connecting circumstances, and
the letters may be considered as written during the continuance of the act complained of."' 2
'The second meaning stated at the beginning of this article.
10

Park. J., in Rawson v. Haigh, 1824, 9 J. B. Moore, 217.

Also 2

Bing. 99.
U2 Bing. 99; 9 J. B. Moore, 217.
' In 2 Bing., this passage is quoted as follows: "We need not go to
the length of saying that a declaration made a month after the fact
would be of itself admissible, but if as in the present case, there are con-

necting circumstances, it may even at that time form part of the whole
res gestae."

AS PART OF THE RES GESTA.

"The letters must be taken as connected with the bank"rupt's state of mind at the time when they were written
"and admissible for that purpose" (i. e.. to show such state
of mind then existing) "as well as to show the intent of his
"departure."
Much subsequent confusion would have been avoided had
he, instead of saying "as well as to show the intent," said
and shows the intent of his departure because written during the continuance of the act complained of, while the
mental state continued the same.
Best, C. J., said: "The going abroad was of itself an equivocal act and requiring explanation, and if so we must endeavor to discover the motive with which it was accompanied, and this is generally, if not always, effected by
declaration of the party himself; declarations or letters
written at any subsequent time, 13 however distant, cannot
be admitted: they must be made or written at the time or
during the continuance of the act or urgency of the circumstances under which they were elicited oi sent. Here
the act of bankruptcy was a continuous act from the time
of leaving the country for France and was confirmed and
completed by remaining there, and as the letters were
written during the stay in that country, they may be considered as forming part of one continuing and the same act."
It is to be expressly noted that the letters were not offered to
prove any past act done by the bankrupt, but to prove the
motive actuating an act already proved.
In Baily v. Bateman, 5 T. R. 512, 1794, the earliest case
of the sort, it was said: What an alleged bankrupt "said at
"the time in explanation of his act may be received in evi"dence. Whatever he says before his bankruptcy is evi"dence explanatory of the act done by him. Here, he ab"sented himself from home under suspicious circumstances
"for which his reasons were asked and without doubt it was
"competent to inquire of the witness to whom he com"municated them what those reasons were."
13Lees v. Martin, I Rob. 210, 1832, Parke, B., acc.: "The statement
"must be made while absenting himself or immediately on his return
"to be admitted as part of res geta." It must exhibit an existing purpose, which is the same throughout, the whole being one continuous act.
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The statement was made immediately on his return home.
The absence from home was one inseparable whole, the
setting out, the remaining away, and the return, which
completed it; all pervaded by the same motive.
One sentence in the opinion opens an instructive field for
speculation-the statement that any statement made before
bankruptcy is evidence explanatory of the act done by him.
'o ii Robson v. Kemp, 4 Esp. 233, 18o2, Lord Ellenbor,,ugh said: "If the declarations of the bankrupt have
been before the act, they may show with what intention it
was clone, and it would be evidence. But declarations and
conversations taking place subsequent to the commission
of the act of bankruptcy are not admissible."
If this means that a statement of an intention to defraud creditors not accompanying any act may be shown
to prove such intention as an existing mental condition,
and, such intention being shown to exist, that any subsequent equivocal act of a sort appropriate to carry such
intent into effect should be referred thereto, but that a
statement of a past motive for a completed act is a mere
narrative statement of such a state of mind, and so inadmissible to establish it as affecting the quality or nature of
the act, it states the effect of the case of Sugden v. St.
Leonards as qualified and explained in Woodward v. Gouldstone.
In both Rawson v. Haigh and Bateman v. Baily, the
journey was one continuous whole-the start, the stay and
the return, all referable to the same motive. There was no
new journey ascribable to new motives, the same purpose
which prompted its inception must also have caused its
continuance, and the abandonment of it must have led to
its close.
In the attempt to bring together under some common principle the cases in which the term res gesta has been used
to indicate diverse ideas, these cases have been made to
stand for the principle that to include a statement as the
contemporaneous qualifying context of some provable fact,
it is but necessary to show that the fact was part of a continuous transaction still going on when the statement was
made. The fact, as it were, is to be elongated and carried
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over to include a later statement reciting it and all because
the two form part of one consecutive whole. This is
sometimes expressed as follows, that the inquiry is not to
be directed to ascertain after what lapse of time an admissible statement may follow the fact, but whethei the fact
cannot be stretched out by means of this principle of continuous transaction to reach and include the statement
The fallacy lies in this: in the bankruptcy cases the statements are not admitted because accompanying, through the
connection of a continuous transaction, the fact of leaving
home or because in any such sense they are pars rei gestae of
it; they are admitted because they show a motive, an intent,
the proved existence of which during any part of the transaction is evidence of its existence during all other parts
thereof, because the whole is but one transaction, actuated
by the same intent. The whole journey is res gesta to this
extent, that the mental condition of the actor at every stage
is the same and so is open to investigation to prove his
intent at any particular point thereof which may be in
issue.
Where knowledge of a fact is necessary to be proved,
generally its exhibition must precede the point of time in
issue, for knowledge may be suddenly acquired after the
event. 14 Whether bodily condition may be exhibited after
the time in controversy depends in its nature whether a
slow growth, or the result of sudden accident.
In matrimonial causes, the state of affections during a
long period is under investigation, to show their nature,
whether proper or. improper at the precise time in question,
evidence may be given of any expression of them by word
or act within a wide range of time.
The case of Cattison v. Cattison, 22 Pa. 275, is very

similar to the bankruptcy cases: a woman appears at midnight at a neighbor's door; to explain her presence at that
hour so dressed, she says she has fled from her husband's
cruelty; this is admissible not because, thewhole flight being
one continuous transaction, the statement is thus drawn
to and made contemporaneous with the cruelty-not because while flying the continuity of events was unbroken,
"1Swift v. Ins. Co., 6_ N. Y. 186.
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and thus no chance for concoction was presented, 15 for,
had she wandered the entire night and then in the morning
asked for succor, her reasons for her position could still be
given in evidence; but because the flight was so far one
transaction that the same fear, the same motive must be
taken to exist at all parts of it, and its proof at one time
prove its existence at every other point of time during the
continuance of such transaction. It was admissible because it explained her presence at the neighbor's, it was
important because it accused her husband of cruelty
This is practically the same principle on which, in cases
of fraud in the purcha.r o sale of property, evidence of
other frauds of a similar character committed by the same
parties at or near the same time are admitted; because, as
was said in Lincoln v. Clafih., 7 Wall. 132, "the inference
"is reasonable -that they proceed from the same motive."'u
Field, J., p.. 138. They, in fact, all form part of one greater
fraudulent scheme.
True, the evidence admitted was of acts done, but the
act, were only admissible because they tend to show a
fraudulent purpose at the time of their commission, and
so through the identity of motive throughout, go to prove
the fraudulent nature of the sale in issue.
A quite distinct use of the term is that expressing the
extent of a business about which two or more are legally
7
identified.1
The cases in which this use occurs are those of agency,
either actual or constructive, as that which exists between
the members of a band of conspirators, whereby each is the
agent of all in doing whatever is appropriate to the furtherance of the common illicit purpose. It is sometimes said
that the acts of all the conspirators throughout are the res
gesta. What all do is the act and so the crime of each, and
when each is tried, it is for the acts of all; it is in this sense
that the whole conspiracy is open to investigation as the
res gesta, though but one conspirator is on trial.
This is not peculiar to conspiracy, it pervades the whole
"The test in Com. v. Werntz, infra.
-See also Meyer v. People, 8o N. Y. 264.
'The third meaning stated at the beginning of the article.
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law of agency, of master and servant-in fact, the conspiracy raises the agency, or perhaps more accurately it, like
agency, or the relation of master and servant, creates such
a legal identity and responsibility as to all acts done or
words spoken in furtherance thereof, as does agency for
similar things, within the proper limits of authority, or the
position of servant for what is said and done in the course
of employment.
Under this conception of res gesta, an act is admissible
or inadmissible on the same terms exactly as a statement,
the sole test for either is whether it is appropriate to further
the common object, not whether made during the pendency of the conspiracy; it is not an identity as to all acts
during the time limits of the conspiracy--only as to such
at are appropriate to effect its object.
So in agency, the test is the limit of the agent's power;
so also in cases of master and servant, it is the range of the
servant's duties which determines.
As a rule, in conspiracy both words and acts are necessary
to success. In agency, the agent is generally empowered
to speak as well as act, sometimes to act only. Servants
are generally employed to act, not to talk, though sometimes their position may require both.
The question so far treated is the power of the conspirator, agent or servant to speak for the co-conspirator.
principal or master, to bind him directly by his speech unaccompanied by any act, that identity which makes the
admission of the one the admission of the other.
In addition, many statements are admissible, not because they fall within the scope of the agent's powers, but
because they accompany and explain acts which the agent
is empowered to do. They are admitted not to bind the
principal directly, but to show the character of the act, which
so explained binds the principal.
As was well said by Chief Justice Tilghman in Magill
v. Kaufman, 4 S. & R. 321, 1818: "An agent is authorized
to act, therefore his acts, explained by his declarations during the time of action, are obligatory upon his principal;
but he has no authority to make confessions after he has
acted.and therefore his principal is not bound by his confessions."
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The latter part of this taken as a statement of the law
of agency generally is too narrow; he may have authority
to make confessions, or perhaps more accurately explanations, of what he has, as agent, done; this depends on the
nature of the business entrusted to him, on what, in this
sense, is the res gesta. So in Morse v. Connecticut River
R. R., 6 Gray, 450, the statements of a baggage-master
and station-master accounting for the loss of a trunk were
held admissible though no part of the res gesta of the loss,
because it was "the duty of these agents to deliver the
"'baggage and account for the same if missing"
Such a duty is exceptional. however, and, as a rule, statements of agents must either be in furtherance and not
explanation of the master's business, or they must accompany acts themselves within the scope of the agent's or
servant's employment, in which case they are admitted
simply as part of the res gesta of such acts.1 8 In those
courts where the term res gesta is used also as indicating
those acts of the agent for which, as a whole, the principal
is responsible, the business about which the two are identified, both forms of statement-those directly binding the
principal and those which do so indirectly only by showing
the true quality of the act which, so explained, binds himwill often be admitted as part of the res gesta; thus confusing under one head statements admissible whenever
made with those only admissible when contemporaneous
with some act done.1 9
Under the fourth use of this term indicating those facts and statements forming an inseparable part of the main fact, and necessary to a
proper understanding of it, and subject to all the requirements thereof.
"Take this case for'instance,-an anarchistic conspiracy,--the following evidence offered: (i) a confession made to a policeman during
the pendency of the conspiracy, of steps already taken; (2) a similar
statement at the same time made for the purpose of convincing a possible recruit of the success of the project, and so of securing his services;
(3) a boast as to the intentions of the conspirator; (4) a similar statement of intention, but made while throwing a bomb.
The first would be inadmissible, it having no tendency to further
the common object. The second admissible, because appropriate for
that purpose. U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 46o. These depending 6n
the fact that all things appropriate to carry out the common object,
make up the overt act for which all are legally responsible. In this
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What, then, are the principles which determine the admissibility of such contemporaneous statements? Two
views with some slight variants have been held.
i. That only those statements which in point of time
accompany an act actually in progress and which are necessary to explain its true nature are admissible as part of the
20
res gesta.
2. That any statement narrative of a fact made so immediately after it that there is no chance for concoction or
error in memory is admissible as part of the res gesta, and
that where a condition is in evidence, not merely evidence
explaining its nature, but also narrating a very recent cause
21
therefor, is admissible.
In Bedingfield's case, a trial for murder, 14 Cox, C. C.
341, Lord Cockburn, C. J., after consultation with Field
and Manisty, JJ., rejected evidence of statements of the
victim, made not more than two minutes after the occurrence and while the blood was gushing from her cut throat,
and while seeking aid to stanch her wound The statement was this: "See what Bedingfield has done to me."
"It is not so admissible" (as pars rei gestae). said he, "for
it is not part of anything done or something said while
something was being done. but something said after something done. It was not as if, while being in the room and
sense pars rei gestae. The third inadmissible for the same reason as the

first, but the fourth, admissible, because while alone no part of the common criminal enterprise, it accompanied and gave color to an act itself
a part thereof, and was admissible on principles applicable to contem:
poraneous explanatory statements accompanying any and all relevant
facts.
' This appears to be a recognition of the old established practice
which allowed, because it could not prevent, a witness to testify to the
whole of a fact; everything which, while a witness of such fact, he
perceived in any way, by sight or hearing, but which excluded anything occurring after the fact was over, for at that moment he ceased
to be a competent witness and had no standing to speak in evidence at
all. This view is supported by at least two English cases and substantially by the Supreme Courts of New York and Massachusetts and
probably at present by the Supreme Court of the United States.
'This view is supported by two Nisi Prius cases in England, by the
Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey and probably by the
majority of the American State Courts, and for a timer at least by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
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while the act was being done, she had said something
which was heard." Here the statement was made "after
it was all over, whatever it was, and after the act had been
completed."
Under this view a statement narrative of a
past fact could not be admitted as pars rei gestae of that
fact, no matter how soon after made--- only statements which
and gave color to a fact could be so adboth accompanied
22
mitted.
In Agassiz v. Tramway Co., 21 Weekly Rep. 199, Mr.
Baron Bramwell says: "If the question had been 'Did you
hear the conductor say anything?' her answer being, 'Yes,
I did,' and neither had been allowed, I would say that the
court was right; the question was put with a view to getting
hearsay evidence from a man that might render persons
liable whom he had no right to bind." The remark was
made just as the plaintiff had disentangled herself from the
wreck of the tramcar.2 3 "It is impossible to admit the
remark as part of the res gesta-it was in no sense one of
the surrounding circumstances; the res were all gestae by
the time the remark was made, and the plaintiff's cause of
action was quite complete without any such words, which
indeed for all they had to do with the accident might as
well have been spoken when the car had been taken back
to the stable."
The statements then must be made while the act is being
done, they must relate to it and tend to explain it.
In New York the leading case is Waldele v. R. R., 95
'And so Pitt Taylor gives as his fourth rule as to admissibility of
declaration as part of the res gesta the following: "That an act can-

not be varied, qualified or explained by a declaration which amounts to
no more than a mere negatizie of a past transaction, nor by an isolated
conversation, nor by an isolated act done, at a later period."
However, a statement which tended to explain the true nature of the
fact it accompanied, if such explanation was necessary to a proper

understanding of the fact for the purposes of proof in the case in hand,
would not be inadmissible because narrative of some other prior
event. If the fact were unequivocal, if it needed no explanation, if its

probative effect were not altered by the explanation afforded by contemporaneous statements, such statements would of course not be
admitted. (See also note at the end of this article.)
"nCompare Coyle v. Hanover R. R., 55 Pa. 396, and R.
R. v. O'Briw,

119 U. S. 99.
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N. Y. 274, in which the earlier cases are collected and
commented upon. The first is Luby v. R. R., where the
conductor of the car immediately after the accident, while
getting off the car and out of the crowd that surrounded
him, was asked why he had not stopped the car, and
answered that the brake was out of order. The case was
reversed on appeal because these declarations were admitted, the court saying: "The statements were no part
of the driver's act for which the defendants were sued. It
was not made at the time of the act so as to give it quality
and character. The alleged wrong was complete and the
driver when he made the statement was only endeavoring
to account for what he had done." "To be admissible they
must constitute the fact to be proved and must not be the
mere admission of some other fact." Comstock, J.
In Whitaker v. Eighth Ave. R. R., 51 N. Y. 295, an
action for injury caused by the wilful act of defendant's
driver in running into plaintiff and throwing him into an
excavation, it was held on appeal to be error to admit evidence that immediately after the car had passed, the driver
had cursed plaintiff and said "Let him fall in and be killed,"
because, being made after the car had passed and the injury
done, it was no part of the res gesta.2 4 In People v. Davis,
56 N. Y. 95, an indictment for abortion, the woman was
dead and it having been shown that she had gone away
with the defendant in a buggy, a statement made on her
return as to what the doctor had done and said to her in
the interim was on appeal held inadmissible, Grover, J.,
saying: "The res gesta was at the doctor's office in
another town, and it is clear that its narration was no part
of that thing. Anything said accompanying the performance of an act explanatory thereof, or showing its purpose
or intention,25 when material is competent as part of the act.
' In Hamilton v. R. R., 51 N. Y. ioo. Also cited abusive remarks made

by a conductor while refunding an extra fare paid by the plaintiff at
the time of his wrongful ejection some hours before, was held incompetent to prove the quo animo of the ejection. The ill will of the conductor might readily have arisen since the ejection, in fact it probably
grew out of the plaintiff's conduct then and afterward.
'If it is to show its intention undoubtedly it need not be precisely
contemporaneous with the act, it is enough if it be made while the
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But when the declarations offered are merely narratives of
past occurrences they are incompetent."
In Casey v. R. R., 78 N. Y. 518,26 a child had been run

over by a car, the acts and statements of the engineer while
extricating the body of the child from the wheels were
held admissible as part of the res gesta. The two New
York cases cited in favor of admission of the testimony in
the Waldele case were Swift v. Ins. Co., 63 N Y 186, and
Snicker v. People, 88 N. Y. 192. In the first, the insured,
to explain 27 his evident bad health, had said he was suffering
from scrofula. Shortly after he stated to the company's
medical examiner that he was not aware of any disease.
Medical testimony showed that he had died of chronic
scrofula. His first declaration was held competent to prove
that the representation by which .the insurance was procured
was false to the knowledge of the insured. This was
admitted not as part of the res gesta of the examination,
but as a statement showing knowledge of a fact proven to
exist; when such knowledge is material, any statement made
so near before the time of examination as to exclude the
possibility that the knowledge had been forgotten was admissible; if made after, the knowledge might have been acquired subsequent to the examination and not have existed
at that time.
In Snicker v. People it was held that what was done and
said by a third party was sufficiently near in point of time to
a certain command of the prisoner to the prosecutrix and
had sufficient relation to it to be part of the res gestae,
and might reasonably be inferred to be part of a common scheme to subject the prosecutrix to violence. That
case was simply this, that upon the whole of the evidence, including the proximity in time, there was sufficient
prima facie evidence of an illegal combination between the
prisoner and the third person above, to subject the girl to
intention may be presumed to continue unchanged. Sec supra. And
it is to this probably that his remarks in Mosely v. Ins. Co., "that

length of time between the act and its subsequent narration is not
material," were directed,
' The headline is stated too broadly.
"It is probably not necessary that the statement should accompany

any external symptoms of ill health. See supra, p. I95.
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violence, to make the acts and statements of each admissible
against the other as acts or statements in furtherance of the
common object. As Earl, J., in the principal case says,
these cases have no bearing on the present cases, in fact
their only resemblance is that the term res gesta is used
throughout.
Having thus reviewed and distinguished the earlier cases,
he finds no difficulty in holding that where the action is for
injuries negligently inflicted, "the res gesta was not the
fact of the injury nor of the collision, these facts were apparent and undisputed." "The point of the inquiry was
how he came to be struck. The manner of the accident was
the res gesta and these declarations made after (in this case
half an hour after) the accident had happened, after the
train had passed from sight and the whole transaction was
terminated, were no part of that res gesta,28 had no connection with it and were purely narrative. It has been well
said the res gesta must be a res gesta that has something to
do with the case and then the declaration must have something to do with that res gesta." In this case the declarations, he says, are "not made under circumstances that they
are in any way confirmed by the res gesta,29 and they had
no relation to what was then present or had just gone by." 0
He then says: "Suppose the intestate had been found with
a mortal wound freshly inflicted and he had charged that an
individual, naming him, had thirty minutes before inflicted it. Would such evidence be admissible? Clearly
not." Yet in the case of Mosely v. Ins., a similar statement was admitted and there was nothing to fix the time of
the injury, if any, at any period less distant.
The court rejects the argument that there being a strong
probability of their truth3' they should be admitted. The
same may be said of many statements not under oath, which,
'The idea of tes gesta here is the occurrence as exhibited in its true
light by surrounding acts and statements, the principal fact with its
concomitant circumstances.
"'Here is a different idea; the res gesta is here the principal'-fact
alone, or at best with its physical accompaniments.
' This seems to mean, the statement is admissible though made at
the moment the principal fact ended, else it conflicts with the earlier
case cited with approbation.
Woodward v. Gouldstone, L. R. Ii A. C. 369, accord.
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though made under circumstances entitling them to implicit confidence, do not answer the requirements of the law.
"Declarations which are received as part of the res gesta
are to some extent a departure from the general rule. And
when they are so separated from the act they are alleged
to characterize that they are not part of that act or interwoven into it by the surrounding circumstances so as to
derive credit therefrom, they are no better than any other
unsworn statements, depending entirely on the credit of the
party making them."
The statements are not competent to explain the condition
of the intestate when found. There was no question as to
his condition; it was not to explain his condition, but to
show what had caused it, that the statement was offered.
"Such a statement if so admissible could not be excluded, no
matter how far distant," so long as the results of the cause
still existed.
In Massachusetts the court in Coin. v. Pike, 3 Cush. I8I,
1849, a statement of the victim, some little time after the
assault sufficient to summon a watchman, but while she was
lying in the place where she was injured, bleeding profusely,
was admitted, the court, Dewey, J., saying: "The time was
so recent after the accident as to justify the admission of the
declaration as part of the res gestae." "Much must be left to
the discretion of the presiding judge." This last phrase has
become of great importance, having been embodied in the
editions of Greenleaf on Evidence subsequent to it,

2

and

so has served to extend to the court a power wholly unrestrained by any governing rules to admit such narrative
statements of recent events it may deem of service to the
elucidation of the case.
The later cases in Massachusetts have, however, imposed
a series of principles and tests by which the exercise of the
court's discretion is to be controlled and which would
have excluded the declaration in Com. v. McPike. In Com.
'In the edition of 1848, all the cases relative to res gesta are thosel
which deal with statements explanatory of the. intention or motive
governing the act in question or with the subject of conspiracy, partnership and agency, and statements narrative of past occurrences are said
to be inadmissible, § uio. The test constantly reiterated is that they
be contemporaneous with the fact.
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v. Hackett, 2 Allen, 136, a witness testified that at the
moment of the affray he heard deceased cry out, "I'm
stabbed," reaching him within twenty seconds he heard him
say :33 "I'm stabbed. I'm gone. Dan Hackett has stabbed
me." This statement was admitted only because "uttered
in the presence of a person who was present when the blow
was struck, who heard the first words uttered by the deceased, and who went to him after so brief an interval of
time that the declarations or exclamations of the deceased
may be fairly deemed a part of the same sentence as that
which followed instantly after the stab. It was not an abstract narrative statement of a past occurrence depending for
its force and effect solely on the credit of the deceased, unsupported by any principal fact and receiving no credit or
significance from the surrounding circumstances."
In Lund v. Tynsborough, 9 Cush. 36, it is said: "There
must be a main or principal transaction and only such
declarations are admissible as grow out of the principal
transaction, illustrate its character, are contemporaneous
with it and derive some degree of credit from it." And "a
declaration having force by itself as an abstract statement
detached from any particular fact in question, is not admissible in evidence, because it depends on the credit of the
person making it and, therefore, is hearsay." This is quite
sufficient to exclude any narrative statement no matter how
soon after the event it is made; it depends on the credit of
the party making it, although the short space of time may
add to such credit by removing the chance of concoction.
In Massachusetts, it is worthy of remark, the term res
gesta has never been used to indicate that similarity of
circumstances which proves the continued existence of the
same state of mind or body, at the time in dispute and at the
date of the declaration exhibiting it. The question is said
to be, in Bradford v. Com., 126 Mass. 42, whether a previous
act (or similarly a declaration) indicates an existing purpose which from known rules of human conduct may be
fairly presumed to continue over and control the doing of
the act in question, it is admissible?
*3This was not in response apparently to any question as to the

cause of his condition, a reply to which would have been of course a
narrative thereof.
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The case of Mosely v. Insurance Co., 8 Wall. 397, sUpports the second view, that even narrative statements of a
past cause of a present condition made almost contemporaneously with the occurrence which it narrates are admissible. Clifford and Nelson, JJ., dissenting. As authority that declarations to be part of the res gesta need not
be contemporaneous with the main fact the bankruptcy case
of Rawson v. Haigh, and especially Park, J.'s statement
therein, were relied upon.8 4 As has been seen, the bankruptcy cases deal with a different question and a different
conception of res gesta from the one in hand. The point
in issue in Mosely's case was whether the insured had died
from the results of illness or accident. His wife testified
that during the night he had left his bed between twelve
and one o'clock. His son testified that about twelve he had
found his father in the shop lying with head on the counter
and had asked him what was the matter and that he replied
that he had fallen down stairs. This answer was held
properly "competent to prove the fall" as. part of the res
gesta. "Here," said Swayne, J., "the principal fact is the
bodily injury. The res gestae are the statements of its cause
made almost contemporaneously3 5 with its occurrence and
those relating to the consequences made while the latter
subsisted and were in progress." They are "the declarations
which show the reality of its (the sickness) existence and
its extent and character." Two things must concur: the
consequences of the occurrence must still be in progress,
and the statement must be almost contemporaneous with
the cause thereof which it recites.
Do such declarations tend to show the extent and character of the consequences, in this case the illness, in any true
sense, as they form part of the surrounding circumstances
necessary to its proper understanding?
True they account for its existence, but it is only in the
rarest cases that a knowledge of the cause can aid in a true
, See supra, for discussion of this case, pp. I96-197.
"Professor Thayer objects very forcibly in this article on Bedingfield's
case, Am. Law Rev., Vols. 14 and 15, that there is no adequate proof
of the time of the fall if it occurred and therefore no means of ascertaining how long after the statement was made.
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perception of the nature of the consequence. A broken leg
is a broken leg, whether caused by a trolley accident or a
fall from a tree, and while sometimes it may help the diagnosis to know whether it is caused by one of the two,
knowledge of how the fall or accident occurred, whether
by the victim's carelessness or that of the motorman, can
be of absolutely no aid to either physician or juryman in
ascertaining the present character of the injury. Such
knowledge may gratify our curiosity, but it does not increase our knowledge of the nature of the injury. The
court is careful to restrict statements narrating the cause
of an existing condition to those almost contemporaneous
with its occurrence. The declarations would seem rather
to have been admitted as part of the res gesta of the cause
of the illness than of the illness itself, because in fact almost
contemporaneous with the origin of it. And the case is authority for the rule that where a statement is made shortly
after a fact it narrates and while its consequences are in
progress it is admissible as part of the res gesta.
The importance attached to the cases of Thompson v.
Trevanion and King v. Foster, supports this view of the
case. In Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 1693, a nisi
prius case, Lord Holt, in an action by the husband on behalf of his wife for injuries to her, allowed what the wife
said immediately after the hurt and before she had time to
devise or contrive anything for her own advantage to be
given in evidence. 3
The facts are not stated, it does not appear how great was
the lapse of time, or to whom the declaration was made.
What Lord Holt3 7 was mainly interested in showing was
that while the wife was incompetent on the trial as interested, her statement made immediately after was not open
to such objection, because no matter how great might be
her interest and desire to misrepresent the facts to her advantage, she had had no opportunity to do so. It is apparently to the objection that the wife was an interested

' Lord Ellenborough in course of argument in Aveson v. Kinnaid, 6
East, 193, says, "as part of the res gesta."
' Compare his language with the extract from Style's Register, written
only twenty-three years before.

Cited.

Supra, p. 191.
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party that the court's attention was directed. If Lord Holt
meant to hold that any statement made by a party to the
act or anyone having special means of knowledge if made
under circumstances which preclude the possibility of fabrication, it is apparent his ruling has not been followed by
English judges. If such a broad general principle had existed, there would have been no necessity for the formulation of those rules, rigidly enforced as they are, of exceptions to hearsay. which form so large a part of the law of
evidence. Practically all evidence admitted thereunder
would have come in under this broad general principle,
together with much that has always been excluded. Jessel,
M. R., did indeed attempt to lay down a much more restricted general rule of exception to hearsay in Sugden v.
St. Leonards, L. R. I P. D. I54,3.8 but it was not accepted by
his brother justices in that case and was expressly rejected
in Woodward v. Gouldstone, L. R. II App. Cases, 469.
R. v. Foster, 6 C. &. P. 325, was a criminal case, also at nisi
prius. A witness who had not seen the accident, but who
hearing the victim groan had gone to his aid, was allowed
to testify to what he said in reply to an inquiry as to what
was the matter. Gurney. B.. said: "What deceased said at
the instant as to the cause of the accident is clearly admissible." Park, J., said: "It is the best possible testimony
that under the circumstances can be adduced to show what
it was which knocked the deceased down."
Here appears Sir George Jessel's idea that where it is
difficult to obtain other evidence, a hearsay statement made
under circumstances doing away with the probability of
concoction ipso facto becomes admissible. Whatever may
have been the tendency of the courts at the time R. v.
Foster was decided, it has been seen this idea has been
thoroughly exploded as part of the English law. And these
being the only reasons advanced for the admission after the
' His test was as follows: (i) The case must be one in which it is
difficult to obtain other evidence; (2) The declarant must be disinterested; (3) The declaration must be before dispute or litigation, so
that it is made without bias; (4) The declarant must have peculiar
means of knowledge. It may be well to remember that Jessel was
primarily an equity judge where there is no jury to be misled.
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completion of a fact of a narrative statement of it, it would
appear that such evidence would now be held inadmissible
and that Baron Bramwell's statement in Agassiz v. Co.
may be taken to state the modem English rule. In fact, in
O'Brien v. R. R., 119 U. S. 99, the Supreme Court of the
United States, though against a strong dissent, have held
that a statement of a conductor as to the speed of his train
made from ten to thirty minutes after the accident and
while the wreckage was still strewn about was inadmissible.
"It was," says Harlan, J., "a mere narration of a past occurrence :" a mere assertion of a matter not then pending and
as to which the engineer's authority had been fully exerted.
It is not to be deemed part of the res gestae, because of the
brief period intervening between the accident and the
declaration. The occurrence had ended when the declaration was made and the engineer was not in the act of doing
anything which could possibly affect it. Field dissenting
Fuller, C. J., Miller and Blatchford, JJ., concurring with
him, said that evidence of declarations are admissible as part
of the res gestae though not strictly contemporaneous with
the main transaction, "When made under the immediate influence of the principal transaction and so connected with it
as to characterize or explain it." Such an accident "would
lead to great excitement among the passengers, and the
character and cause of the accident would be the subject of
explanation for a considerable time." This case places the
majority of the court in full accordance with the strict
English rule and marks the end of the influence of Thompson v. Trevanion and Rex v. Foster in the Federal courts.
These two cases, however, largely through the sanction
given them in Mosely v. Ins. Co., have had a great influence
upon the decisions in the state courts of the United States.
They are followed to their logical conclusion in the case of
Com. v. Werntz, 161 Pa. 591.
The court, Mitchell, J., says: "Each case must necessarily
depend on its own circumstances to determine whether the
facts offered are really part of the same transaction." He
quotes with approval the test laid down in the American
and English Encyclopedia of Law, 102, that declarations
"if made under such circumstances as raise the reasonable
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presumption that they are the spontaneous utterances of
thought created or springing out of the transaction itself
and so soon thereafter as to exclude the presumption that
they are the result of premeditation or design, are admissible
as part of the res gestae." 39
"The intervals of time (between the fact and statement)
do not appear with exactness," he goes on, "nor are they
material, for it is apparent they were not great and that the
continuity of events was not broken."
This phrase has been seized on as the touchstone of admissibility, but to properly understand it. it must be read
in the light of the above quotation from the Encyclopedia,
and this sentence which follows it: "The declarations were
made by the party best informed and most interested, and
were made at a time and place and to a person and under circumstances which effectually exclude the presumption that
they were the result of premeditation and design."
The continuity of events is one which prevents the possibility of concoction. It is not the mere sequence of cause
and effect that must remain unbroken, it is not enough
that the effect of the occurrence is plainly apparent.
The continuity of events must remain in the sense that the
overpowering influence of the principal fact must still continue. There must be no cooling space, no chance to concoct if the will to do so existed. The principal fact is still
continued upon the mental retina of the declarant as an
existing fact and there is thus little or no risk of that inaccuracy which comes from the re-creation of a past fact
by a conscious effort of memory. 40 This would appear to
'In
addition Mitchell quoted a sentence from Wharton's Evidence,
sec. 259, whose only effect is to double the existing "convenient obscurity" of the term and which 'adds nothing of value to the above
quotation. "The sole distinguishing feature (of the res gestae) is
that they should be the necessary incidents of the litigated act necessary in this sense that they are the immediate preparations for or
emanations of such act and are not produced by the calculated policy
of the actors."
' In Fulcher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 471, a murder case, the victim was shot in the throat. Fifteen minutes after the shooting
the witness gave him brandy and camphor to clear his throat of the
blood which had previously prevented him from speaking, and fifteen
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be the meaning of an unbroken continuity of events, of the
statement that it is a matter for the court to determine from
the particular facts before it whether the whole is one continuous transaction. Such a rule of admissibility of statements as pars rei gestae is a pure exception to hearsay.
These statements are not necessary to the proper understanding of the fact they accompany. They are purely
narrativeof a past event, which, it is true, may and probably
has caused the condition existing when they are made.
The probability of accuracy, the practical impossibility of
concoction and the great advantage of allowing proof of
practically contemporaneous statements, these are the considerations which lead the courts to waive the usual guarantees of oath and cross-examination. 4'
In Com. v. Werntz, three statements, all to the same
effect, were made, one at practically the very time of the
assault and while still in the election booth where it occurred, the second while being removed to an adjacent
drug shop (both admitted without objection), and the third
(excluded by the court below) made in the shop while the
wounds were being dressed. The witness had heard all
three, he had heard the scuffle, had helped in the removal
and was himself dressing the wounds. The continuity mentioned was that onward rush of events which prevented
a clear retrospect of the occurrence and which continued
the impression of the fact upon the mind of the victim.
minutes later, thirty ininutes after the shooting, he made a statement
as to the circumstances of the shooting and who shot him. This was
held properly admissible as part of the res gestae. Surely this is on
the very verge of evidence admissible because of lack of opportunity
for concoction; the victim's mind apparently was clear even while unable
to speak. Had he spoken at once it is highly improbable if a second
statement made thirty minutes later while still under treatment would
have been admissible. It would seem that the impossibility of obtaining
any earlier account and the importance of obtaining the victim's story,
led the court to admit the statement because it was the first that he
could tell. It amounts almost to holding that any statement by a party
to an occurrence made at the first possible opportunity is admissible, a
still further extension of the rule in the case of Com. v. Werntz.
" This is very similar to the requirements laid down in Sugden v.
St. Leonard's, by Jessel, M. R., supra, note 38, as sufficient to admit
declaration as- exceptions to hearsay.
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The change of place alone was not enough to break
the continuity, the spell or influence. Change of place is
like lapse of time an element, and it is for the court to say
whether either or both are sufficient to free the mind from
the overpowering impression of the occurrence. Change of
scene often breaks the impression, as see the two cases of
Ogden v. R. R., 23 W. N. C. 191, and Lyons v. R R., I29
Pa. T r3, and the fact that the statement is made on the
spot and in the presence of the physical after-effects of the
accident is always an element for the court's consideration.
In Com. v. Werntz as has been seen, first, the witness,
who heard the statement, was within hearing of the affray
and probably heard it, and so in a sense was a witness as to
both the fact and the declaration and second, the declarant
was a party to the affair.
Is either or both of these essential? As to the first, in
Van Horit v. Com., I88 Pa. 143, similar statements were
admitted, the boy who had heard them not having perceived anything other than the wounded condition of the
woman when she made them to indicate that a crime had
been committed or the time of its commission. The wounds
spoke for themselves, the statement was not necessary to
explain their nature and so to show her physical condition.
It was a narrative statement of the past cause of a perfectly
apparent condition. This is a logical result of the reasons
set forth in Corn. v. Werntz for admitting-such statements.
They are admitted not as necessary to the proper understanding and therefore an inseparable part of the fact,
which the witness having perceived is narrating to the jury,
but because the declarant had no opportunity for mistake
or concoction and her statement was, therefore, presumptively true, and if true, was undoubtedly of great value.
Of course there must be some evidence both of the principal
fact and of the time when it occurred, in order that the
statement may be seen to be made under its unbroken influence, but as in Van Horn v. Com., I88 Pa. 143, this may
be proved by circumstantial evidence. The presence of
those very sequalia which continue its impression if it exist
may prove also its existence and the time when it occurred.
As to the second of these elements, must the declarant
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be a party to the principal act; must he act or be acted upon?
There is no sound restriction to such declarants in the
reasons given, but as the admission of such evidence is an
exception to the rule against hearsay and an extension, in
fact a departure separate in principle, from the previous
rules admitting statements as pars rei gestae, it would be
unsafe to say that the courts would carry it beyond the
cases already decided, all cases where the declarant was a
party. 42 An extension still further to admit any narrative
of any fact proven to exist by whomsoever made if made
s6 immediately after the occurrence as to remove any chance
of error or inala fides43 would, however, be the logical result
of the principal case. In fact the chance of concoction is
less; a party may have an interest to invent an account ex
culpating himself or rendering others liable, which can exist
only in the most exceptional of bystanders. There is no particular sanctity in the statements of parties to acts. If offered
in evidence against the party making such statement, he cannot object to it; while not strictly evidence of the fact, he
can ask for no better evidence; it may be said to be a substitute for proof by evidence to which the party who has
made the statement is estopped from objecting. Be this
as it may, this extension of the principle of the admissibility
of evidence as pars rei gestae to embrace narrative stateinents made under circumstances proving their bona fides,
has not in any way superseded or destroyed the original
conception. A witness to a fact may still testify not merely
to the bare fact itself, but to all that context which gives it
its true color, both what was done and what was said at
the time of the act by the actors and by all who were present, so far as such acts or statements tend to explain or
qualify the principal fact. A witness is still a witness, not
to the bare physical happening, but to the fact as it existed,
as explained by the circumstances under which it took place.
So, statements made even by bystanders during the occurrence are admissible if they tend to show its true character
' Not to the action before the court but to the act.
"3 It may be that a less duration of time or change of plan would be
sufficient to remove the impression from the mind of a stranger than
from that of a party.
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as a necessary part of the witness' story. This is of course
subject to this qualification, that mere statements of opinion

cannot be shown, no matter how closely they accompany a
relevant fact. It is still the jury's exclusive function to form
opinions as to the effect of facts, in those rare cases where
opinion is admitted in evidence it is only as an aid to the
jury's function; they are entitled to cross-examination, not
merely as to facts on which it is based, but on the soundness
of the process by which it is arrived at from those facts, that
they may judge, not merely upon the adequacy of its foundations, but also as to its value as a guide to them in their deliberations. And it may be here remarked that in the great
number of cases the remarks and often the acts of bystanders if carefully examined will be found to be but expressions of opinion as to the effect of the facts.
Thus there appear to be two distinct conceptions and uses
of the term res gesta.
I. INDICATING THE ENTIRETY OF A TRANSACTION, often
continuing over a space of time.
(a.) The extent of the matter in issue, or under investigation, every part of which during its continuance is the
very matter to be proved, the length of time between the
circumstances of it being unimportant if all form part of it.
(b.) A series of acts part of one transactionin the sense
that they either presumably proceed from the same motive
or intent or are done while the same bodily condition may be
fairly supposed to continue unchanged, so that any exhibition of such mental or physical condition during the pendency of such transaction is proof of the same condition at
every stage of it.
In this class of cases if the bodily or mental condition of
a person at a particular time is relevant, an exhibition of
it to be admissible need not occur at or even near such time,
so long as the conditions so far remain the same that the
mental-or bodily condition may be fairly presumed to remain
the same throughout.
(c.) A business in the furtherance of which two or more
persons are legally identified, as in a combination to e fect
a common purpose either legal or illegal. There everything
done or said by each is legally the act of all if done or said
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not merely during the pendency of the combination, but in
furtherance of the common object. There is not an identification during a certain space of time, but from the inception of the scheme until its completion in all things necessary to effect the common object. A statement need not be
made at any particular time during the carrying into effect
of the conspiracy. If the common object be abandoned or
accomplished no further act can be in' furtherance thereof,
and so nothing said or done thereafter can be part of the
'business about which all are identified with one another.
In none of these need the statement be contemporaneous,
actually or practically, with the principal fact which it is
offered to prove.
II. THE TERM IS USED TO INDICATE THOSE CONCOMITANT
CIRCUMSTANCES OR CONTEXT OF A FACT IN ISSUE OR RELEVANT FACT WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND ITS
TRUE NATURE. Here every one of those circumstances is

admissible (acts or declarations) if necessary to understand
the fact aright and if they accompany the fact. 44 The coin-

cidence of time is here of the utmost importance, though
there is a difference of opinion as to how far the coincidence
must be exact and how far an unbroken sequence of events
the continuance of the immediate influence of the fact may
supply its absence.
Certain requirements are essential everywhere:
I. There must be a principal fact, itself relevant, already
proven to exist; such fact, like any other fact, may be proved
either by direct or circumstantial evidence.
2. The statement must relate to and tend to show the
true nature of such principal fact. It must not be a statement of some other fact unnecessary45 to the proper understanding of the principal fact.
"So a statement may be admissible as pars rei gestae of a statement
or of an act. So both acts and statements inadmissible to show sanity of
one to whom they were done or adversed, are competent to explain the
acts done or statements made by such person in response thereto.

Wright v. Tathamn.
' In those jurisdictions admitting declarations after the act is over
but while the immediate results are existing, the declaration explains
the existence of the resulting condition by narrating its cause; it proves
rather than explains the cause itself, but even there it must describe
or explain either the cause or the resulting condition.
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3. The declarations4 6 must accompany the fact which
they are offered to explain. The difficulty is as to what is
a sufficiently close accompaniment. All cases agree, on the
one hand, that if the statement is exactly contemporaneous
with the fact it is admissible. Equally all agree that when
the whole occurrence is past, when all the immediate results
have ceased, when its pressing influence is over and the
whole has by all concerned been relegated to the memory as
a past event, capable of deliberate contemplation, then a
narrative statement of it is clearly not admissible as part of
its res gesta, even though the fact is still working out
47
through the laws of cause and effect its final legal result
and is in such sense incomplete. It is in that large class of
cases comprised between these two extremes that a difference of opinion is found.
One group holds that a practically exact coincidenceof time is required, that the declaration must accompany
and elucidate some relevant act actually going on. An act
is not continued in this sense by the presence of the immediate results of the act. When the causal act has itself
ceased, a narration of it does not become admissible because
it tends to account for the existing results thereof. The
declarations by themselves are not admitted as independent
evidence; the fact as explained by them4" is the evidence
which goes to the jury. It is as part of the fact49 that they
An act accompanying a fact, if necessary to understand it, is admissi-

ble as par res gestae. If it does not accompany it it is still, if it tend to
explain it, relevant. There is no act which is narrative of a past fact,
it may be probative of its existence or quality, but can scarcely recite it
in any other sense. An act whenever done if it prove or explain a
relevant matter is relevant, or as Pitt Taylor says, the expression is
perhaps unfortunate, is part of the res gesta.
T
If a wrong, this means that its injurious tendencies have neitherbeen diverted by an independent agent nor yet exhausted their destructive power.
"'And itself lending credit to them.
* The fact itself must be one whose true nature is not apparent without such explanation. The surrounding circumstances must not onlyexplain, the explanation must add something to the fact which it did
not possess before. The explanation must change the probative value
of the fact. If the declarations are of no value for this purpose, theydo not become admissible because they recite some other fact, evem
though it be itself of the utmost importance.
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are admitted, pars rei gestae, and not as an exception to the
rule against hearsay.
The other group of cases holds that any statement though
narrative of a past occurrence is admissible if made while
the immediate results of such occurrence are still apparent
and so soon after as to be made under the overpowering
influence of it and so Practically without an opportunity for
concoction. These are generally admitted as part of the res
gesta of the occurrence,50 sometimes as part of the res
gesta of the resulting conditions. 1
This is an exception to hearsay. The statements are not
admitted as explaining the nature of the fact, but as a
narrative proving its existence. Its probative value rests
on the credit of the declarant, the proximity of the fact,
the practical impossibility of concoction, the probable accuracy of statement as to a fact only just past, the effects
of which are still apparent; these guarantee the credit upon
which, however, still rests the value of the evidence.
This coupled with the constant difficulty in proving such
facts by other means supplies the reasons for the exception
to hearsay. The adequacy of these reasons has been denied
in England. 52 That this latter view adds a new exception
to hearsay, there seems no doubt.
The advisability of this relaxation is a question of the
policy of the court. Weighty arguments can be offered on
both sides. Against it may be urged that it is by no means
certain that a statement in the heat of the occurrence is
either accurate or impartial. That it is at best extremely
difficult to say when the time is so short or rush of events
so overpowering that concoction becomes impossible. That
usually the declarations emanate from the party most interested to exculpate himself or to fix the blame on another.
That the first impulse of a party is to excuse himself if not
to accuse others. That there is no danger of a failure of
other evidence in any large general class of cases, though
occasionally there may be such failure in individual cases.
Com. v. Werntz, I61 Pa. 591.
'1 Mosely v. Ins. Co., 8 Wall. 397.
"Woodward v. Gouldstone, L. R. ii A. C. 369, per Lord Herschell.
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In short, that the declarations, while sometimes of service,
are very likely to be misleading. That there is no such
necessity for their admission, no such probability of accuracy and good faith to make it advisable to relax in their
favor existing rules, and that the advocates for their inclusion have at least failed to meet their burden of proving
affirmatively any sufficient reason for altering the established
practice.5 3
On the other hand it may be well said that the rule
against hearsay, on the whole, shuts out too much evidence
that is commonly recognized as sufficient to govern men in
their most important affairs, and which would in the trial
of legal causes be both reliable and of the utmost utility,
that it is preserved largely because much hearsay, probably
the bulk of it, being unreliable and misleading, could not
be excluded save by a general rule or purely at the caprice
of the courts. This being so, whenever any sort of declarations can. be grouped into a class capable of definite ascertainment, and such declarations are found to be in general
both accurate and truthful and of great use in the elucidation of questions otherwise difficult of adequate proof, it
is the policy of the law not to turn its back on a means of
proof generally trustworthy, because occasionally there may
be a danger of the jury being misled. If the circumstances
are such as to clearly discredit the statement the court may
exclude; in other cases the jury can be so directed that no
more than proper weight will be given it. The danger is
that when the declaration is important, the court may be
led to stretch the rule so as to include it,5 4and that the courts
will end by admitting any narrative which they consider
necessary for the proper understanding of the case by the
jury and which they believe from the circumstances under
which it is made to be probably accurate and trustworthy.
Francis H. Bohlen.
The argument that such alteration should be left to the legislature
seems untenable. The admission of evidence is a matter of procedure
which the courts should be and are competent to regulate, and almost
all relaxations of strict rules of evidence as to hearsay have heretofore
been introduced by the courts without legislative aid.
'"As in Fudcher v. State, note 4o, supra, p. 214.
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NOTE.
In his pamphlet answering the criticism of Mr. Pitt Taylor on Bedingfield's case, Lord Cockburn states that anything said by the victim
while the criminal act was in progress either actually or constructively
would be admissible. What does he mean by constructive? Does he
mean that although the assailant had desisted from his attempt the
victim still believed he was endeavoring to carry it into effect? Pitt
Taylor ridicules the idea that this could in any way affect the admissibility of the evidence, or that his lordship could have so used the term,
but in the first place, if her assailant was still pursuing her statements
during her flight would accompany and explain the object of her flight,
her flight would still surely be a fact both relevant and equivocal,
requiring explanation, and her statements would explain and show its
true nature. In fact the criminal act as a transaction, is made up of
the assailant's action to accomplish and the victim's to avoid the injury. No story of the crime is complete which does not embrace both.
The whole is the matter under investigation. Her flight in this sense
is part of the criminal transaction ana any statements accompanying it
are admissible to explain it. Can then it matter if her flight is needless,
that the assailant without her knowledge has abandoned his purpose or
has been by some injury to himself been rendered incapable of effecting it? Is not the flight, if flight, from what is believed to be a
present danger, is still in a true sense a part of the transaction?
If the danger is known to be over there can be no flight, the whole
act is completed. What is done is done in consequence of the completed attempt. It may be the result of the whole transaction, but is no
part of it. That she is seeking aid for her wounds is a fact needing no
explanation other than her wounded condition. That she is flying needs
the explanation for her fear. The one act as perceived by the witness
requires no explanation, the other does. Her statement does not explain
her reason for seeking medical aid, her wounds are sufficient for that,
it is a purely narrative statement of a condition apparent without need
of explanation.

